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ABSTRACT 
 
 
WHAT DRIVES THE PROPERTY-TYPE FOCUS OF REITS? 
 
BY 
 
SEUNGHAN RO 
 
December 2, 2010 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Alan J. Ziobrowski 
 
Major Academic Unit: Real Estate 
 
Using a sample of 678 property portfolio changes (acquisitions, dispositions and joint ventures) 
of U.S. REITs during the period 1990 to 2009, I investigate the issue of what drives the property 
sector focus of REITs. Geltner and Miller (2001) argue that investors prefer to make their own 
diversification decisions using narrowly focused REITs as an explanation for the lack of 
diversification. On the basis of their argument, I develop and examine the research question of 
how investors react to a change in a REIT’s property type focus.  
 
I find a significantly negative market reaction to acquisition and acquisitional JV events that 
decrease property-type focus. However, I do not find consistent supporting evidence that 
xii 
 
dispositional events, including property sales and dispositional JVs which increase property-type 
focus, yield significantly positive abnormal returns. Only in the limited case of other property-
type dispositional JVs do I find a statistically significant positive market reaction relative to 
those derived from the dispositional events that do not change the property-type focus on the 
basis of a difference test.   
 
In terms of the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions, I also find strong evidence of a 
diversification discount derived from acquisitional events that decrease the property-type focus 
of a REIT regardless of the sample period and the type of property portfolio change. However, I 
do not find evidence of a wealth benefit received by dispositional events which increase the 
property-type focus. In addition, I find that the deal size of the property portfolio change relative 
to the size of the firm and the number of security analysts following the firm are both significant 
variables that affect the abnormal returns upon the announcement of a property portfolio change. 
I also find no evidence to support the idea that the diversification discount comes from 
endogeneity as argued by Villanova (2004).  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
From a mean-variance perspective, diversification reduces the unsystematic risk associated with 
the variability of a portfolio's return in excess of the market return. Optimal diversification is 
defined as the set of assets that maximize the return for a given level of risk or, alternatively, 
minimize the risk for a given level of return. Markowitz (1952) developed modern portfolio 
theory (MPT) to formalize the concept of diversification for an investment portfolio. Markowitz 
employed stocks to examine his theory; however it is equally applicable to bonds, real estate, 
government treasury securities, and other financial assets.  
 
Consistent with Markowitz’s modern portfolio theory, Young and Graff (1995) argue that 
diversification within a real estate portfolio requires the composition of many different properties.  
However, in terms of property-type diversification strategies, there is a conflict between the 
investment behavior of large institutional real estate investors and Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITs). In particular, large institutional real estate investors tend to own and manage properties 
broadly diversified by property-type. On the other hand, REITs show a strong tendency to invest 
in only one particular property-type.  
 
Several studies show that the majority of institutional real estate investors such as life insurance 
companies and pension funds consistently tend to diversify by property-type for their real estate 
portfolios. Webb (1984) finds that nearly 61% of institutional investors diversify by property-
type. In a more recent survey, Louargand (1992) observes that 89% of institutional investors 
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diversify by property-type. According to Seiler, Webb and Myer (1999), intra-asset 
diversification is employed to identify as many different groups of sub-asset classifications as 
possible to maximize heterogeneity among sub-groups. This practice reduces the correlations 
between the sub-groups and increases the diversification of the portfolio. Such an increase in 
diversification reduces unsystematic risk and causes a corresponding increase or upward and 
leftward shift in the efficient frontier. Thus, the greater the intra-asset diversification provides 
greater reduction in overall unsystematic risk, and the higher optimum level of portfolio 
efficiency.  
 
In contrast, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) have a tendency to concentrate their 
investments into a single property-type. According to the National Association of Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (NAREIT) Handbooks (1997–2008), more than 90% of the REITs in the U.S. 
equity REIT sector focus on one property-type or occasionally two closely related property-types. 
The other 10% of the equity REIT sector is diversified by property-type in terms of either total 
market capitalization or number of properties. In the early days of REITs, diversified REITs 
dominated the industry. Figure 1 shows that diversified property REITs accounted for more than 
30% of NAREIT index during the 1980s. In recent years, REIT management has shifted its 
strategy. The percentage of diversified REITs has decreased steadily as REITs have tended to 
specialize in the various property sectors such as healthcare, hotels, apartments, retail, office and 
industrial.  Thus the conflict with Markowitz’s modern portfolio theory, and the inconsistent 
investment behavior of REIT management with the diversification strategy of institutional real 
estate investors both motivate the fundamental research question of this study. What drives the 
property sector focus of REITs?  
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There are several theories which attempt to explain this contradictory behavior. Prior corporate 
finance literature finds the existence of the ―diversification discount‖ referring to a negative 
correlation between the market value of a firm’s assets and the degree of diversification in the 
assets it holds. They find diversified firms tend to trade at a discount relative to similar focused 
firms. Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), and Comment and Jarrell (1995) find a 
negative association between firm performance and diversification within the firm. The idea 
behind these findings is that investors do not want to invest in firms who do their diversifying for 
them.  Investors prefer to make their own diversification decisions. Consistent with this theory, 
Geltner and Miller (2001) argue that early REITs often diversified by property-type since 
individual relatively small REIT investors wanted passive investment vehicles and thus were best 
served by a diversified portfolio of properties. But in the 1990s, REIT investors became 
dominated by institutions that prefer to make their own diversification decisions.  Thus REITs 
responded to the needs of their investors by becoming more focused. 
 
Another theory argues that once REITs became more actively managed based on the belief that 
management expertise could usually be more effective when it specialized by property-type. Not 
only REITs but also mutual funds have a strong tendency to focus on investments in areas where 
they believe they have expertise. However, Ro and Ziobrowski (2009) examine whether the 
management expertise of focused REITs drives their lack of diversification and find no evidence 
of superior performance associated with REIT property-type focus.  In addition, Yao, Clifford, 
and Berens (2004) find that hedge fund sector specialists on the whole, are no better than 
generalists in terms of their exposure to systematic risk.  
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Purpose of the Study 
In this research, I examine the diversification discount of REITs. If investors prefer to make their 
own portfolio diversification decisions by employing pure-play REITs (property sector focused 
REITs), I hypothesize that investors will react positively to a REIT’s property portfolio changes 
which reconfirm their narrow property-type focus. Conversely, investors should react negatively 
to events which decrease a REIT’s property-type focus (i.e. the REIT diversifies). To investigate 
this research hypothesis, I identify a sample of publicly announced property portfolio changes by 
REITs coming from property acquisitions, disposition, joint ventures and mergers from 1990 to 
2009, and employ standard event-study methodology to compute abnormal returns around the 
announcement date for these events. In addition, as a robustness check, this study splits a sample 
period (1990 – 2009) into two sub-periods: (1990-1999) and (2000-2009). 
 
Extending the implication of the argument further suggests the second research question, “In the 
presence of appropriate controls, what additional explanatory variables significantly influence 
abnormal returns on events which change a REIT’s property-type focus?” I employ cross-
sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to investigate the relationship between 
abnormal returns and a set of potential variables of interests as suggested by the literature.  
 
Importance of the Study  
This dissertation extends the literature in four important ways. First it tests Geltner and Miller’s 
(2001) explanation for the lack of diversification among REITs. The most prior studies examine 
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the relationship between performance and diversification strategy and find evidence of a 
diversification discount. However, several studies have been critical of the diversification 
discount arguing that endogeneity in the data may have caused the negative relationship between 
firm value and diversification (Campa and Kedia 2002, Graham, Lemmon and Wolf 2002, 
Villaonga 2004). To avoid endogeneity, I control for operating performance prior to the 
announcements of portfolio changes.  Second, this dissertation fills a gap in the literature by 
investigating the market reaction when REITs reconfirm or invest contrary to their focus. Prior 
literature including Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2003) finds wealth benefits received when 
companies reconfirm their geographical focus in the acquisition. However, they do not examine 
the wealth effect in terms of property-type diversification. Third, prior literature finds evidence 
of the wealth effect based on the change of REITs property portfolio diversification associated 
only with acquisitions and mergers. This dissertation provides evidence for a more 
comprehensive range of events adding property dispositions and joint ventures.   Finally I 
examine the influence of certain variables of interests on abnormal returns associated with a 
change in a REIT’s property-type focus.  
 
Organization of Dissertation 
While this chapter provides a general introduction to the study, the remainder of this dissertation 
is organized as follows. The second chapter reviews the relevant literature. The third chapter 
presents the data construction and test methodology.  The fourth chapter provides the empirical 
results and discussion. The fifth chapter concludes the dissertation and suggests future areas of 
study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Overview of the Literature Review 
The literature review is presented in three sections: diversification issues in finance studies, 
diversification issues in real estate studies, and the wealth effect of real estate portfolio 
transaction studies. The diversification issues in finance studies reviews several theories 
associated with the relationship between firm value and diversification, mainly developed in the 
finance literature. The literature of the diversification issues in real estate studies focuses on 
property-type diversification covering REITs and other real estate investments. The literature of 
the wealth effect of real estate portfolio transaction studies discusses the studies of the wealth 
effect of REITs around changes in property portfolios. 
 
Diversification Issues in Finance Studies 
While a number of finance studies attempt to examine the relationship between the market value 
of the firm and the degree of its diversification, the evidence still remains debated. Early finance 
literature on the diversification issues finds the existence of the ―diversification discount,‖ where 
diversified firms are valued at a discount relative to focused firms, and develops several theories 
to support the empirical findings. However, more recently, several studies criticize the earlier 
diversification discount studies. They argue that the diversification discount results from the 
systematic difference between a stand-alone firm and a single segment of a multi-segment firm, 
resulting in endogeneity issues.  
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Diversification Discount 
A number of corporate finance studies find evidence of a diversification discount. Lang and 
Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Comment and Jarrell (1995), and DeLong (2001) all find 
negative correlation between firm value and the degree of diversification. There are several 
alternative theories which may explain the observation that diversification reduces the value of 
the firm: information asymmetry, agency cost, and the inefficient internal allocation of capital.  
 
Ferris and Sarin (2000) argue that a more diversified firm trades at a discount relative to a 
focused firm because a diversified firm has more informational asymmetry between a firm’s 
managers and its investors. This makes investors less likely to invest in the firm. They find that 
more diversified firms have less analyst following, lower analysts’ consensus and greater 
forecast error than focused firms, which results in an increase in information asymmetry and 
negatively affects the value of diversified firms.  Bhushan (1989) also finds a negative 
relationship between the number of analysts and the number of lines of businesses. He argues 
that because of the increased number of business lines that the analysts must follow, the greater 
the difficulty and cost.  Thus diversified firms have fewer analysts than more focused firms. In 
addition, diversified firms have more heterogeneous information sets among analysts, which 
result in a reduced consensus among analysts. Chung and Jo (1996) find a positive relationship 
between the number of security analysts tracking a firm and the market value of the firm. They 
argue that investors tend to trade securities which they recognize and the cognizance stems from 
information provided by security analysts, which reduces information asymmetry.  
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Agency cost has also been linked to the diversification discount. Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) 
argue that the diversification discount occurs because there is the conflict of interest between the 
shareholders and the managers of a publicly owned firm. Diversification may benefit managers 
because management’s power or managerial compensation is associated with firm size. Thus, 
managers tend to sustain diversification strategy even if it reduces shareholder benefit. They find 
managerial equity ownership is negatively related to the level of diversification. Jensen (1986) 
argues that firm growth benefits managers since it increases management’s power and prestige.  
Diversification is one means of growth. Jensen and Murphy (1990) find evidence that 
diversification raises the compensation of managers since managerial compensation is positively 
related to the size of a firm. Consistent with agency cost theory, Amihud and Lev (1981) find 
that managers engage in diversification to reduce their undiversified employment risk (e.g. risk 
of losing their job). 
 
Several studies find that the resource allocation in diversified firms differs from that in focused 
firms, suggesting that diversified firms tend to misallocate internal capital. Stulz (1990) finds 
that firm diversification results in inefficient internal capital investments such as overinvestment 
in low-performing businesses. Lamont (1997) also finds that diversified firms allocate their 
internal capital inefficiently, overinvesting in poor sectors. Shin and Stulz (1998) argue that 
diversified firms tend to disregard traditional market indicators of the value such as Tobin’s q 
since different business segments are associated with different market indicators. They find 
evidence of inefficiency in the capital allocation of diversified firms. Rajan, Servaes and 
Zingales (2000) find that increases in diversity of resources and opportunities in diversified firms 
result in more inefficient investment and less valuable firms.   
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Challenges to the Diversification Discount 
Campa and Kedia (2002), Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) and Villaonga (2004) challenge 
evidence of the diversification discount. They argue that the diversification discount results from 
an endogeneity bias since stand-alone firms are not comparable to segments of multi-segment 
(diversified) firms.  They find that diversification does not destroy value. Rather diversification 
is the acquisition of already discounted businesses segments. Poor performance firms tend to 
diversify to enhance their firm value, which makes diversified firms appear to have a 
diversification discount. Campa and Kedia (2002) employ instrumental variables such as firm, 
industry, and macroeconomic characteristics in two-stage regressions to control for endogeneity 
and find evidence that the lower value of diversified firms results from an endogeneity bias. 
They find no evidence of a diversification discount after controlling for this endogeneity in the 
Compustat database. Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) are critical of prior studies that assume 
each segment of a diversified firm is comparable to a ―typical‖ stand-alone firm as a benchmark. 
They find evidence supporting systematic differences between segments of diversified firms and 
the stand alone firms (endogeniety), which are not comparable. Villaonga (2004) finds that 
diversified firms trade at a discount prior to further diversification into additional business 
divisions. 
  
Diversification Issues in Real Estate Studies 
While variety topics in diversification issues are explored in real estate studies, this review 
mainly focuses on literature in terms of property-type diversification. It classifies studies into 
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studies employing real estate investment and studies focusing on real estate investment trusts 
(REITs).  
 
Property-type Diversification in Real Estate Investment 
De Witt (1996) finds that the majority of real estate fund managers have strategies to diversify by 
property-type as well as by location for their real estate portfolio construction. Firstenberg, Ross, 
and Zisler (1988) investigate the performance of more than 600 individual real properties from 
1974 to 1987. They classify the properties into four types: office, retail, industrial and apartments, 
and create mean-variance efficient portfolios composed of real estate only and another composed 
of mix-assets with real estate, common stocks and bonds.  They find that including different 
property-types in real estate portfolios increases the efficiency of both portfolios.  
 
Lee (2001) employs data on retail, office and industrial properties around 326 different locations 
in the United Kingdom during the period 1981 – 1995 to investigate real estate returns in terms 
of property-type and regional factors. He finds that the level of risk reduction resulting from 
property-type diversification is significantly greater than that achieved solely by regional 
diversification. Hartzell, Hekman, and Miles (1986) examine quarterly data from a single 
institutional portfolio composed of 270 properties over the ten years 1973 – 1983 and find that 
property sector diversification offers more effective risk reduction for real estate investment 
when compared to regional diversification. Miles and McCue (1984), Lee and Byrne (1998), 
Fisher and Liang (2000) and Byrne and Lee (2000) find similar evidence. 
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Cronqvist, Hogfeldt, and Nilsson (2001) employ a portfolio composed of 32 Swedish real estate 
firms from 1990 to 1996 to examine the value loss for firms signaling the intention of following 
a diversifying strategy. They find that when firms diversify they pay too much when acquiring 
new assets and when hiring and firing employees in the creation of the new organization. They 
also find that firms pursuing diversified strategies tend to have private rather than institutional 
ownership.  
 
Boer, Brounen, and Veld (2005) examine how the corporate focus of real property companies 
affects their stock performance employing data from 275 international real property companies 
in the U.S. and Europe over 1984 – 2002. They find that property companies in the U.S. have a 
tendency to focus on property-type while those in European countries are more likely to focus on 
geographical regions. In terms of analyzing the relationship between firm focus and stock 
performance, they find that firms with geographical focus significantly outperform the overall 
market while the stock performance is positively related to property-type focus. In addition, this 
study finds that an increase in firm focus increases firm-specific risk. 
 
Property-type Diversification in Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) 
As mentioned in Chapter one, many of the early REITs maintained a property-type 
diversification strategy. Pagliari, Scherer, and Monopoli (2005) show that during the 1980s more 
than 30% of REITs were composed of diversified REITs although that percentage has fallen 
steadily. Boer, Brounen, and Veld (2005) also find that in the early nineties, the average number 
of different property-types in a REIT’s portfolio was more than three; today this number has 
fallen below two. Geltner and Miller (2001) suggest three explanations for the change. First, 
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earlier REITs were often diversified by property-type because REIT investors wanted passive 
investment vehicles and thus were best served by a diversified portfolio of properties. But, after 
the significant legislative changes to the REIT structure in 1993, REIT investors became 
dominated by institutions that prefer to make their own diversification decisions. Second, as 
REITs became more actively managed, they acquired management expertise that specialized by 
property-type. That is, they exhibited a strong tendency to focus on investments in areas where 
they believed they had expertise requiring distinct and highly specialized management skill. 
Third, investors prefer assets that are simpler to understand and evaluate thus reducing 
information asymmetry.  Since focused REITs are less complex than diversified REIT, they are 
therefore easier to analyze and thus more highly valued.   
 
Miles and McCue (1982) examine the ratio of return to risk of equity REIT portfolios compared 
to commingled real estate funds from 1972 to 1978, regressing on variables including property-
type, size, and location. They find the correlation between different property-types is relatively 
low and conclude that property-type diversification provides significantly higher risk adjusted 
cash yields in comparison to the other variables.  
 
Gyourko and Nelling (1996) examine whether the type of property and the regional distribution 
of properties held in the underlying portfolio of REITs influences the systematic risk of the REIT. 
They find no meaningful impact for either property-type or geographical diversification in their 
REIT stock market return data. However, this study employs a relatively limited data period 
(1990 – 1992) before institutions were legally permitted to invest in REITs. 
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Chen and Peiser (1999) examine how the performance of REITs before 1993 differs from that of 
REITs after 1992 when institutions became active in the REIT market. They find that after 1992, 
REITs somewhat outperform the REITs before 1992 while risk patterns are not very different. In 
addition, they also classify the various REIT property-types by average monthly return, standard 
deviation, and beta. They find property-type focused REITs perform better than diversified 
REITs, but provide no analysis of the statistical margin of the difference. 
 
Capozza and Seguin (1999) investigate the effect of REIT specialization by analyzing cash flows 
and firm value. They concentrate on the issue of whether management expertise in terms of focus 
and diversification strategy affects REIT performance and value. They conclude that more 
diversified REITs actually make higher gross yields from their properties.  However, the higher 
gross-cash-flow yields of diversified REITs are offset by higher corporate-level expenses, which 
results in the reduction of value. In terms of cash flows available to shareholders, they find no 
evidence that the cash flows vary with REIT specialization. This study analyzes the value of 
REITs on the basis on property level cash flow rather than REIT performance from the 
perspective of investors in stock market. 
 
Eichholtz, Op’t Veld, and Schweitzer (2000) examine the returns of US equity REITs from 1990 
to 1996 to determine whether managerial focus of REITs explains performance. To measure the 
performance of REITs in terms of property-type and regional diversification, they use Jensen’s 
alpha from CAPM and multifactor models and find evidence supporting the notion that property-
type focused REITs perform better than property-type diversified REITs while regionally 
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focused REITs underperform regionally diversified REITs. However, the sample period (1990 – 
1996) spans one of the most significant periods of change in the US REITs industry. 
 
Benefield, Anderson, and Zumpano (2008) examine the diversification discount related to a 
property-type diversification in equity REITs. They employ 75 US equity REITs from 1995 to 
2006 to analyze the performance in terms of Jensen’s Alpha, the Treynor Index, and the Sharpe 
Ratio. They find evidence that diversified REITs significantly perform better than focused REITs 
for the period 1995 – 2001. However, this study does not match the property-type composition of 
diversified and focused REITs. That is, the sample selected by Benefield et al. for property type 
focused REITs does not accurately reflect the property type mix in their diversified REIT sample. 
Since different property-types may perform better than other property-types in different time 
periods (Gallo, Lockwood, and Rutherford 2000), different compositions of property-types may 
result in bias. Pagliari, Scherer, and Monopoli (2005) and Riddiough, Moriatry, and Yeatman 
(2005) also argue that portfolios with different property-type compositions are not fully 
comparable when different real estate property indices have different mixes of property types. 
Benefield, Anderson, and Zumpano also ignore the differences in leverage between portfolios.  
Riddiough, Moriatry, and Yeatman (2005) find evidence that mismatched leverage may result in 
over a 2% annual return difference for the comparison.  
 
Ro and Ziobrowski (2009) also examine whether property-type focused REITs perform better 
than diversified REITs. In order to compare performance, they construct two different portfolios; 
one is composed of only focused property REITs and the other composed of only diversified 
property REITs. They then match the various property-type allocations in the both portfolios and 
15 
 
rebalance annually. They investigate abnormal returns employing CAPM and the Fama-French  
three-factor model with Carhart’s momentum factor and find no evidence of superior 
performance associated with property-type focused REITs.  Consistent with modern portfolio 
theory, they also find higher market risk associated with focused REITs. 
 
Wealth Effect of Real Estate Portfolio Transaction Studies 
Early literature on the wealth effects of real estate portfolio changes suggest that property 
portfolio transactions are value-creating events for sellers, but value-neutral events for buyers. 
For example, Glascock, Davidson and Sirmans (1991) employ standard event study methodology 
to examine the wealth effect of transactions which realign real estate portfolios. They utilize a 
sample of 150 real property transaction announcements including 99 buyers and 51 sellers over 
1971 – 1986. They find statistically significant positive abnormal returns for sellers associated 
with real property transactions while the abnormal returns of buyers are not statistically different 
from zero. Elayan and Young (1994) investigate the wealth effects of shareholders on merger or 
acquisition announcements in which the buyer or seller is a real estate company. They also find 
evidence that shareholders of seller companies experience statistically significant abnormal 
returns while those of buyer companies do not have significant excess returns. McIntosh, Ott and 
Liang (1995) examine the shareholder wealth effects of REITs on the property transaction 
announcement and find consistent evidence supporting that there is no significant excess return 
on acquisition events while sale transaction events experience positive excess returns. Booth, 
Glascock and Sarkar (1996) also find similar results employing more precise event data and a 
more appropriate method, GARCH, to estimate expected returns and standard errors. They 
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attempt to explain this finding using differences in the tax treatments for buyers and sellers, or 
the number of buyers relative to the number of sellers.   
 
However, Campbell, Petrova, and Sirmans (2003) analyze the shareholder wealth effects of 209 
REIT portfolio acquisitions over the period 1995 to 2001. Inconsistent with prior literature, they 
find evidence of significant abnormal returns on the acquisition announcement in the aggregate. 
Furthermore, they find wealth benefits received when companies reconfirm their geographic 
focus in the acquisition. The events that do not reconfirm (diversify) their regional focus exhibit 
negative insignificant abnormal returns. However, they do not examine the wealth effect in terms 
of property-type diversification. 
 
Campbell, Gosh, and Sirmans (2001) examine a sample of 85 merger transactions over the 
period 1994 – 1998 when a publicly traded equity REIT is an acquirer. The sellers of 40 events 
are public REITs while the other 45 events have private sellers. Among 40 public-to-public 
mergers, 25 mergers increased the geographic diversification of the acquiring firms while 25 out 
of 45 public-to-private mergers also increased geographic diversification. They find evidence of 
negative market reaction when the mergers increased the geographic diversification of acquirers, 
which is consistent with Campbell, Petrova, and Sirmans (2003).  
 
Campbell, Petrova, and Sirmans (2006) investigate the shareholder wealth effects of property 
disposition by equity REITs for 1992 – 2002. They find evidence of significant positive 
abnormal returns on disposition announcements. However, this study does not examine how the 
market reacts to changes of focus affected by property sell-offs.  
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Campbell, White-Huckins, and Sirmans (2006) examine 185 Joint Ventures by REITs from 1994 
to 2001 and find that the market positively reacts to the announcement of joint ventures by 
REITs. In particular, they find positive significant abnormal returns on the announcement of 
joint ventures if the REIT’s JV partner is a property-type diversified REITs rather than property-
type focused REITs. They argue that property-type diversified REITs employ the JVs to obtain 
highly specialized management expertise in particular property-types, and thus diminish the 
managerial problems associated with property-type diversification. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter presents sources of empirical data and the methodology used to examine the 
following research hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 
This study is motivated by the lack of property-type diversification in REITs and investigates a 
theory developed by Geltner and Miller (2001), i.e. investors prefer to make their own 
diversification decisions with pure-play (property-type focused) REITs. To develop the first 
research hypothesis, Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2003) find a significant positive abnormal 
return to the announcement of the property acquisition to reconfirm their geographical focus. 
Abnormal returns associated with an announcement which reduces geographic focus are 
insignificantly different from zero. However, they do not examine the market’s reaction to 
announcements affecting property-type diversification. Therefore, in this dissertation I examine 
the following research hypotheses.  
 
H1: The market has a significant positive reaction to the announcement of a REIT’s 
property portfolio changes (dispositions, or dispositional JVs) which increase their 
narrow property-type focus. 
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H2: The market has a significant negative reaction to the announcement of a REIT’s 
property portfolio changes (acquisitions, or acquisitional JVs) which decreases a REIT’s 
property-type focus. 
   
Data 
Identification of Property Portfolio Changes of REITs 
Following Campbell, Petrova, and Sirmans (2003 and 2006), I obtain information on 
announcements about the property portfolio changes (acquisition, disposition, joint venture or 
merger) of REITs from the Dow Jones News Retrieval using the Dow Jones Factiva Online 
Database service in the years 1990 – 2009. To be included in the sample, an announcement must 
be found in the Dow Jones Newswire, the Press Release Wires or the Reuters Newswires. The 
announcement day refers to the date of the first report of the portfolio change in one of these 
publications, which provides a trading day if the announcement is made before 3:59 p.m. 
However, if the event is announced after 3:59 p.m., the event day is considered to be the next 
trading day after the announcement. I exclude a transaction from the sample if other significant 
events are announced during the event window or a transaction with a total value less than 5 
million. In terms of the sample selection, I exclude property-type diversified REITs due to the 
difficulty in defining the property portfolio change which increases or decreases property-type 
focus. 
 
Identification of Property-types and Daily Return of REITs 
I employ daily return data obtained from the CRSP/Ziman US Real Estate Data Series which 
provides return series for individual REITs trading on the NASDAQ, New York Stock Exchange 
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and American Stock Exchange. This database provides property-type classifications for 
individual REITs including health care, industrial and office, residential, lodging and resort, 
retail, self storage, and diversified. 
 
Identification of the control variables measured for each property portfolio change 
We obtain the information regarding the size of property portfolio changes by REITs from press 
releases, and from 10Q and 10K SEC filings prior to the announcement. Property type and 
geographical focus change are obtained from the SNL Real Estate database and also from 10Q 
and 10K SEC filings. Other accounting data including total assets, debt and funds from 
operations (FFO) are obtained from COMPUSTAT and from 10Q and 10K SEC filings. The 
numbers of analysts following each REIT are obtained from Institutional Brokers’ Estimate 
System (IBES). I obtain institutional holdings from the CDA/Spectrum 13 (f) Institutional 
Holdings, provided by Thomson Reuters.  
 
Methodology 
Standard Event Study Methodology 
Following Mikkelson and Partch (1986), I employ standard event study methodology to 
investigate the abnormal return for an equally balanced portfolio around the event announcement 
date (acquisition, disposition, or joint venture). I use the market model to estimate the abnormal 
return in reaction to the event, using daily returns with the following equation: 
 
, , ,i t i i m t i tR R             (1)  
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where ,i tR is the rate of return on security i over the period t, which is one day, ,m tR is the rate of 
return on the equally weighted market index. The CRSP value-weighted market return is used as 
the market proxy. Daily returns are obtained from the CRSP database. Day 0 is the 
announcement day, i is the estimated intercept, i  is the estimated slope of the linear 
relationship between security i and the return on the market index, and ,i t is the unsystematic 
component of security i’s return on day t.  
 
The estimated expected return for security i at time t given the daily return is the following: 
 
, ,
ˆˆ ˆ
i t i i m tR R           (2)  
 
where ˆi  and 
ˆ
i  are estimates of i  and i . I obtain these estimates using 60 daily returns from 
day t-250 through day t-20. 
 
The abnormal return (AR) for security i at time t is given by the following equation: 
 
, , , , ,
ˆˆ ˆ( )i t i t i t i t i i m tAR R R R R            (3)  
 
The market model, equation (1), is applied to all samples and abnormal returns are calculated for 
each event day associated with the announcement. To compute the cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR), I use one-day (Day 0), two-day (Days 0, +1), and three-day (Days -1, 0, +1) windows for 
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the time horizon of the announcement period. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for 
security i is the sum of ,i tAR  over the various window periods (1, 2, and 3-day), given by: 
 
2
1
, ,
T
i t i t
t T
CAR AR

         (4)  
 
where T1 is the first day of the interval and T2 is the last day of the interval. 
 
The mean cumulative abnormal return (MCAR) for a sample of N securities is given by, 
 
1
1 N
i i
i
MCAR CAR
N 
          (5)  
 
The expected value of the CAR is not different from zero if there is no abnormal return 
performance. Following Elayan and Young (1994), I employ a t-test for the statistical 
significance of the abnormal return over various window periods (1, 2, and 3-day). The variance 
of the CARs is calculated from t-120 to t-21 and any possible first order serial dependence in the 
excess returns is given by: 
 
1 2, 1
( ) ( ) ( ) 2( 1) ( , )T T t t tVar MCAR T Var MCAR T Cov MCAR MCAR     (6)  
 
where  2 1 1T T T   , 
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The t-statistic for the MCAR over the various intervals from T1 and T2 is 
 
 1, 2 1, 2/ ( )T T T Tt MCAR Var MCAR       (7) 
 
If T1 = T2, 
1, 2T TMCAR
t is equivalent to the t-statistic for tMCAR . 
 
Cross-Sectional Regression 
I develop a cross-sectional ordinary least squares regression model to examine the relationship 
between abnormal returns and a set of potential variables of interests. The control variables are 
selected on the basis of prior literature. I develop the following cross-sectional regression model 
to investigate the relationship.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6lnAR PROPD PROPF SIZE SIZER DEBTR PFFO              
7 8 9 10 11 12INST ANALY GEOD ACDS ADJV JVRT                     (8) 
 
where:  
AR  = Abnormal returns for an equally balanced portfolio around the event 
announcement; 
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PROPD  = Dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change decreases 
property type focus and 0 otherwise; 
PROPF  = Dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change increases property 
type focus and 0 otherwise; 
ln SIZE  = Natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets at the end of the last quarter prior 
to the announcement; 
SIZER  = The ratio of the total price of property portfolio change divided by the firm’s 
total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement (SIZE); 
DEBTR  = Debt ratio or the total debt divided by the total assets of the firm at the end of 
the last quarter prior to the announcement; 
PFFO  = Funds from Operations divided by total assets at the end of the last quarter 
prior to the announcement; 
INST  = Number of shares owned by institutional investors divided by the total 
number of shares outstanding at the end of the last quarter prior to the 
announcement; 
ANALY  = Number of analysts’ forecasts of FFO for the REIT at the end of the last 
quarter prior to the announcement; 
GEOD  = Dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change decreases 
geographical focus and 0 otherwise; 
ACDS  = Dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change derives from 
acquisition or acquisitional JV and 0 otherwise; 
ADJV  = Dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change derives from 
acquisition or disposition and 0 otherwise; 
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JVRT  = Dummy variable equal to 1 if a JV partner is another REIT and 0 otherwise 
 
PROPD is my primary variable of interest.  PROPD is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
property portfolio change decreases property type focus and 0 otherwise. I hypothesize that this 
variable should be significantly negative suggesting that any reduction in the portfolio focus is 
viewed negatively by investors.    
 
PROPF is another primary variable of interest.  PROPF is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
property portfolio change increases property type focus and 0 otherwise. I hypothesize that this 
variable should be significantly positive suggesting that any substantial increment in the portfolio 
focus is viewed positively by investors.    
 
I control for the firm size because several studies in the finance literature find a negative 
association between abnormal returns and firm size (Loderer and Martin 1990; Asquith, Bruner, 
and Mullins 1983). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that larger companies’ managers are less 
bound by shareholder discipline since shareholders exercise less governing power in large firms.  
 
I control for the size ratio between the size of property portfolio change and the size of the REIT 
using SIZER since Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2006) find a significant positive relationship 
between abnormal returns on a property sale by a REIT and the size ratio.  Clearly the larger the 
size of the transaction relative to the size of the REIT, the greater is the impact on firm 
performance.  
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I control for the firm’s debt ratio by using DEBTR, which is the total debt divided by the total 
assets of the firm. According to free cash flow theory suggested by Jensen (1986), firms with 
higher leverage make better investment decisions since less free cash flow leaves them less likely 
to waste resources. Stulz (1990), Maloney, McCornmic, and Mitchell (1993) and Kang (1993) 
also find a significant positive relationship between leverage and returns.  
 
I control for endogeneity using a REIT’s operating performance prior to the announcement of a 
portfolio change.  PFFO, is Funds from Operations divided by total assets. Villanova (2004) 
finds that diversified firms trade at a discount prior to their further diversification into additional 
business divisions.  This implies that the diversification discount results from endogeneity. 
Controlling the operating performance prior to the announcement of a portfolio change, I 
investigate whether the diversification discount may be caused by endogeneity.  
 
REIT institutional holdings are controlled for using INST. As shown in Figure 1, REIT 
management has shifted its strategy through time. In the early days of REITs, diversified 
property-type REITs dominated the industry. However, REITs have tended to focus on a single 
property-type since the early 1990s when REIT investors became dominated by institutions that 
may prefer to make their own diversification decisions.  
 
The number of analysts that forecast the FFO for a REIT is controlled for using ANALY. Chung 
and Jo (1996) find that the number of security analysts positively affects the market value of the 
firm. Ferris and Sarin (2000) also find more diversified firms have fewer analysts following the 
firms’ performance. 
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Geographical focus changes are controlled for using GEOD, which is a dummy variable equal to 
1 if the property portfolio change decreases geographic focus and 0 otherwise. Campbell, 
Petrova and Sirmans (2003) find wealth benefits are received when companies reconfirm their 
geographical focus in an acquisition while events which reduce their regional focus exhibit 
negative wealth benefits. Following Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2003), I define the event to 
decrease geographical focus as the property transaction which expands its property portfolio into 
states where it was not previously operating. 
 
Acquisitional events including acquisitions and acquisitional JVs are controlled for using ACDS, 
which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change derives from acquisition or 
acquisitional JV and 0 otherwise (dispositions or dispositional JV). Campbell, White-Huckins, 
and Sirmans (2006) find positive abnormal returns on acquisitional JV announcements while 
negative abnormal returns are expected on dispositional JV events. 
 
Property transactions including acquisitions and dispositions are controlled for using ADJV, 
which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change derives from acquisition or 
disposition and 0 otherwise (JVs). 
 
 JV with other REITs as a partner is controlled for using JVRT. Campbell, White-Huckins, and 
Sirmans (2006) find positive abnormal returns when a REIT has a JV with another REIT. They 
argue that it is difficult for a REIT to have synergies with a non-REIT partner due to the unique 
REIT institutional structure. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of 678 sample US Equity REIT property portfolio change 
events by year of announcement and property-type over the sample period 1990 – 2009. A 
balanced cross sectional sample represents the REIT property-type population in terms of the 
number of REIT. As shown by the table, over 80% of the sample events occurred in the 
office/industrial, residential, and retail REIT sectors. The sample includes 140 different REITs 
and covers all different property-type focused REITs, but excludes property-type diversified 
REITs due to the difficulty in defining the property portfolio change which increases or 
decreases property-type focus. I examine a relationship between abnormal return and REIT 
property-type, and find no significant relationship.
1
 In terms of the announcement by year, the 
distribution over the sample period varies, but most property portfolio change events occur after 
1993. I find no property portfolio change event by a joint venture over the sub-period 1990 – 
1993 since REITs had not employed joint ventures as an investment strategy prior to 1994 
(Campbell, White-Huckins, and Sirmans 2006). I test for a relationship between the abnormal 
return and the time of the event and find no evidence of the significant relationship.
2
   
 
Table 2 summarizes data on the average value of deal size by year of announcement over the 
sample period. In terms of property transactions including acquisitions and dispositions (Panel 
A), the average value of the 463 property acquisitions and dispositions is over $ 37 million. 
                                                 
1
 The results are available upon request.  
2
 The results are available upon request. 
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During the early- and mid-1990s, the size of the deals was relatively small, less than $ 20 million. 
However, it rose significantly during the late 1990s and continued to stay around $ 40 million in 
2000s. In terms of joint ventures (Panel B), the average size of the 215 deal was over $ 251 
million. We also see the similar tendency increasing deal sizes after the mid-1990s. This 
tendency follows the remarkable growth of the equity REIT market after 1993, triggered by 
legislative changes to the REIT structure which made REITs more attractive investment to 
institutional investors. As we would expect, Table 2 clearly shows that JV deal sizes were much 
larger than property transactions (acquisitions and dispositions). 
 
Table 3 is the distribution of the 678 REIT property portfolio change events by year of 
announcement with the classification of the events in terms of the property-type focus change. I 
employ the definition of property portfolio change developed by Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans 
(2003). They regard portfolio change as a single transaction in which two or more unrelated 
properties are traded from the same seller in a same date. REIT typically trades a group of 
properties from institutional investors or other real estate firms. 
 
Panel A shows 228 property acquisitions and 235 property dispositions by REITs. In terms of the 
property-type focus change, 61 acquisitions decreased the property-type focus of a REIT. The 
other 167 acquisitions reconfirmed the REIT’s property-type focus (same property-type 
acquisition) which did not alter property-type focus. Of the 235 property dispositions, 71 events 
increase property-type focus of the REIT. 164 property-type dispositions are neutral dispositional 
events which do not to change property-type focus.  
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Panel B in Table 3 shows the136 acquisitional JVs and 79 dispositional JVs created by REITs 
during the sample period. According to Campbell, White-Huckins, and Sirmans (2006), an 
―acquisitional‖ JV is defined as a JV that is established as a vehicle for obtaining property at a 
reduced acquisition cost. They define ―dispositional‖ JV as a JV that seeks to obtain cash or 
increase liquidity by partially disposing properties to the JV partner (usually a financier). I find 
that 22 acquisitional JVs can be classified as events which decreased the property-type focus of 
the REIT with the remaining 114 acquisitional JVs reconfirming the property-type focus of the 
REIT. Also, 8 announcements of other property-type dispositional JV are identified as property 
portfolio changes which increase the property-type focus of the REIT.  71 same property-type 
dispositional JVs have neutral dispositional events which do not change the property-type focus 
of the REIT.  
 
Abnormal Returns 
The results of the event study associated with announcements of property acquisition (Panel A) 
and property disposition (Panel B) are presented in Table 4. Each portfolio provides three mean 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in one-day (0), two-day (0, +1) and three-day (-1, 0, +1) 
windows around the announcement date.  
 
In Panel A, all abnormal returns for the acquisition events as a whole are not significantly 
different from zero. However, to investigate the effects of property-type focus change, I 
segregate the 61 acquisitions that reduce the focus of the REIT from those that reconfirm their 
property-type focus. The results indicate that acquisitions which decrease the property-type focus 
of the REIT show significantly negative abnormal returns in all event windows and more than 
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60% of the results are negative in one- and two-day window. By contrast, in 167 same property-
type acquisitions, abnormal returns in one- and two-day window are significantly positive at 10% 
confidence level. The difference test between the two groups is statistically significant over all 
event windows. The results indicate property acquisitions that decrease the property-type focus 
cause a negative reaction in the market. This finding is evidence of diversification discount to 
support the research hypothesis (H2). 
 
In Panel B in Table 4, the overall disposition announcements exhibit positive abnormal returns 
with significantly positive values in all windows. Again I separate the sample, distinguishing 
between those dispositions that sharpen the focus of the REIT by selling ―other‖ property-types 
and same property-type dispositions which have no material impact on the focus of the REIT. 
The 71 dispositions that increase the property-type focus (other property-type dispositions) of the 
REIT show significantly positive abnormal returns in the one- and three-day windows.  The two-
day window is also shows a positive abnormal return although it is not statistically significant.  
In 164 same property-type dispositions, abnormal returns in two- and three-day windows are 
significantly positive, consistent with Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2006). On the basis of the 
difference test between the two groups, the abnormal returns on other property-type dispositions 
are not statistically different from those derived from the same property-type dispositions.  
 
This result is not especially surprising.  A number of prior studies find that asset dispositions by 
firms provide significant benefits to shareholders. For example, Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans 
(2006) find that abnormal returns resulting from major sales of real property by US REITs are 
significantly positive. They argue that the results support that the positive abnormal returns are 
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derived mainly from the value of efficient asset reallocation (property disposition). Consistent 
with their study, I find evidence of positive abnormal returns on all disposition announcements. 
However, I find no evidence to support the hypothesis that the significant positive market 
reaction results from dispositions that increase property-type focus since the abnormal returns are 
not significantly higher than those of same property-type dispositions.  
 
To confirm the findings of Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2003), I examine the effects of 
property geographical focus changes by REITs in Panel C. I separate property acquisitions into 
two groups: those acquisitions that decrease geographical focus (58) and those acquisitions that 
reconfirm their geographical focus (170).   I find that acquisitions which decrease geographical 
focus of the REIT (other geographical location acquisition) show significantly negative abnormal 
returns in one- and two-day events while acquisitions that reconfirm the same geographical focus 
have no significant abnormal returns. The difference test between two groups is statistically 
significant in all event windows, which is consistent with Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2003). 
They argue that this cost of diversification supports the notion that shareholders of REITs give 
greater value to corporate focus rather than diversification since investors prefer to form their 
own diversification decisions. 
 
Table 5 shows the results of the event study associated with announcements of acquisitional JV 
(Panel A) and dispositional JV (Panel B). In Panel A, all abnormal returns for overall 
acquisitional JVs are significantly positive, consistent with Campbell, White-Huckins, and 
Sirmans (2006). When distinguishing 22 other property-type acquisitional JVs from those which 
reconfirm their property-type focus, the results indicate that the acquisitional JVs that decrease 
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property-type focus of REIT have a low or negative level of abnormal returns and no 
significance in all event windows. In 114 same property-type acquisitional JVs, however, 
abnormal returns in all event windows are large and significantly positive. The difference 
between the two groups is statistically significant.  This result provides additional support for my 
research hypothesis (H2) although the market reaction to JV events that decrease the property-
type focus is not significantly negative.   
 
In Panel B in Table 5, the results indicate that dispositional JV announcements which increase 
property-type focus (other property-type dispositional JV) yield significantly positive abnormal 
returns. The difference test shows they are also significantly higher than the same property-type 
dispositional JVs in two- and three-days window. This finding supports the research hypothesis 
(H1).  
 
Cross-Sectional Regression 
Table 6 shows the summary statistics for the raw REIT data used to generate the variables in the 
cross-sectional regression analysis over the sample period. I present average, minimum, and 
maximum values of the total REIT assets, total REIT debt, percentage of institutional 
shareholders, and the number of analysts at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement 
of the property portfolio change.  Funds from Operations are earned during the last quarter prior 
to the announcement of the property portfolio change. 
 
Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics of continuous variables in cross-sectional regression 
analysis over the sample period.  The dependent variable in the cross-sectional regression, CAR 
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(2), is a two-day (days 0, +1) cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for an equally balanced 
portfolio around the event announcement. The deal size ratio is the total price of property 
portfolio change divided by the firm’s total assets (SIZER).   As suggested by Table 2, the deal 
size ratio for joint ventures is nearly four times larger than property acquisitions and dispositions.  
The other variables used in the regression are reasonably consistent among the groups of 
transactions investigated. Panel D shows correlation coefficients among the independent 
variables. As we might expect, the correlation among between the firm size (lnSIZE), 
institutional ownership (INST) and number of analysts is relatively high indicating that larger 
REITs attract higher institutional ownership and greater analyst interest. Correlation among the 
other continuous variables is generally low.  
 
Table 8 presents cross-sectional ordinary least squares regressions with a heteroskedastic 
adjustment following MacKinnon and White (1985). The regressions use 463 property portfolio 
changes deriving from acquisitions and dispositions to test the significance of the relationship 
between abnormal returns and a set of control variables discussed above. The regressand is the 
two-day (days 0, +1) cumulative abnormal return; CAR (2). During the entire sample period, I 
find that the indicator variable (PROPD) for acquisitions that decrease REIT property-type focus 
is significantly negative. This suggests that portfolio changes that decrease REIT property-type 
focus reduce value, confirming my earlier findings presented in Table 4. As a robustness check, I 
repeated the analysis for two sub-periods. (1990 – 1999 and 2000 – 2009) and find consistent 
results.   
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However, I find that the other primary variable (PROPF) for property dispositions which 
increase property-type focus (other property-type dispositions) is not significantfor the total 
sample period.  Only during the sub-period 1990 – 1999 do I find a significantly positive 
coefficient.   
 
With respect to our control variables, during overall sample period, I find no significant 
relationship of firm size (lnSIZE) or deal size ratio (SIZER) to abnormal returns. Debt ratios also 
are not related to abnormal returns and have no significant coefficient over all sample periods. 
This result is consistent with Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2006). Also, I find no significant 
relationship between the FFO and abnormal returns. Thus I find no support for a diversification 
discount derived from endogeneity as argued by Villaonga (2004).  Lastly abnormal returns are 
also not related to whether the transaction is an acquisition or a disposition. 
 
A number of control variables are significantly related to abnormal returns.  Institutional 
ownership (INST) exhibits a significantly negative relationship with abnormal returns.  A higher 
degree of institutional ownership results in more significant negative reaction to the 
announcement of a REIT’s property portfolio change that decreases a REIT’s property-type 
focus. I find a significantly positive coefficient for the number of analyst (ANALY) over the 
entire sample period, confirming evidence found in prior literature. Ferris and Sarin (2000) find 
that more diversified firms have less analyst following, which results in more informational 
asymmetry and a negative impact on the value of the diversified firm. Also, Chung and Jo (1996) 
find that the number of security analysts positively affects the market value of the firm.  
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Consistent with the the findings of Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2003), I find that a decrease 
the geographical focus results in negative abnormal returns. 
 
Table 9 shows the results of the regression on abnormal returns in 215 joint venture 
announcements. As with individual transactions, PROPD is significantly negative for the entire 
sample period which supports research hypothesis (H2). The market has a significant negative 
reaction to the events that decreases a REIT’s property-type focus. However, I again find no 
evidence to support research hypothesis (H1); the coefficient PROPF is not significant.  Thus I 
find no significant positive market reaction to the increase in property-type focus,   
 
I do find a significantly positive coefficient for the deal size ratio (SIZER). This implies that 
higher value deals cause a positive market reaction, consistent with evidence found by Campbell, 
Petrova and Sirmans (2006). As presented by Table 7, the deal size ratios for joint ventures are 
substantially larger than for property transactions, which may be leading to an increase in the 
positive relationship between the deal size and cumulative abnormal return. Consistent with the 
results for transactions in Table 8, the coefficient for the number of analyst (ANALY) is 
significantly positive over all sample periods.  The indicator variable for acquisitional JVs 
(ACDS) is also significantly positive. This supports the findings shown in Table 5.  Abnormal 
returns for acquisitional JVs tend to be significantly positive. This confirms results found by 
Capbell, White-Huckins, and Sirmans (2006).  None of the other variable used in the regression 
are significant.  
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Robustness Check 
As a robustness check of the results, I combine property portfolio transaction events (acquisitions 
and dispositions) and JV events (acquisitional JVs and dispositional JVs) as shown in Table 10.  
This is a comprehensive analysis combining the results of Table 4 (property transactions) with 
the results presented in Table 5 (JVs).  
 
Panel A shows significantly positive abnormal returns in one- and two-day windows for all 
acquisitional events including acquisitions and acquisitional JVs. When segregating 83 other 
property-type acquisitional events from 281 events to reconfirm their property-type focus, I find 
that acquisitional events which decrease property-type focus cause a significantly negative 
market reaction while same property-type acquisitional events yield significantly positive 
abnormal returns. The difference test between the two groups is statistically significant over all 
event windows and supports research hypothesis (H2) of a diversification discount. 
 
The results of Panel B in Table 10 are not very different from those of dispositional events 
included in Table 4 and Table 5. 79 dispositional events that increase property-type focus yields 
a significantly positive market reaction over all event windows. In terms of the difference test 
between other property-type dispositional events versus same property-type dispositional events, 
dispositional events that increase property-type focus are not significantly different from the 
same property-type dispositional events in the two- and three-day windows. Again I fail to find 
evidence in support of research hypothesis (H1): the positive market reaction to the events which 
increase their narrow property-type focus.  
 
38 
 
Table 11 presents cross-sectional ordinary least squares regressions using the entire 678 
property-type portfolio change sample combining two groups: all property transactions including 
acquisitions & dispositions (Table 8) and all joint ventures (Table 9). The overall results are very 
consistent with those of Table 8 for property transactions. Regardless of the time frame, I find 
that the variable (PROPD) indicating an acquisition (Transaction or JV) that decreases REIT 
property-type focus provokes a significantly negative market reaction. This suggests that 
portfolio changes that decrease REIT property-type focus reduce value. However, the other 
primary variable (PROPF) for property portfolio changes which increase property-type focus 
(other dispositions and dispositional JVs) indicates no significance over all time periods.  
 
Relative to the type of event (acquisition, disposition, acquisitional JV and dispositional JV) 
property acquisitions are controlled for using ADJV_Ac, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the property portfolio change derives from an acquisition and 0 otherwise. Property dispositions 
are controlled for using ADJV_Dis, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the property 
portfolio change derives from a disposition and 0 otherwise. Acquisitional JVs are controlled for 
using ADJV_JVA, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change derives 
from acquisitional JV and 0 otherwise. The reference group for these dummy variables is 
dispositional JVs. I find evidence to support the notion that acquisitional events including 
acquisitions (ADJV_Ac), and acquisitional JVs (ADJV_JVA) have significantly larger abnormal 
returns than dispositions and dispositional JVs events. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Conclusion 
A fundamental question in terms of property-type diversification strategies is why there is a 
conflict between the investment behavior of large institutional real estate investors and Real 
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). REITs show a strong tendency to invest in only one particular 
property-type while large institutional real estate investors tend to own and manage properties 
broadly diversified by property-type. Geltner and Miller (2001) argue that earlier REITs had 
often been diversified by property-type because REIT investors were best served by a diversified 
portfolio of properties by employing passive investment vehicles. But in the 1990s, REIT 
investors became dominated by institutions that prefer to make their own diversification 
decisions and REITs responded to the needs of their investors by becoming more focused.  
 
In this dissertation, I investigate the issue of what drives the property sector focus of REITs. I 
examine the above argument of Geltner and Miller (2001), which addresses the research question 
of how investors react to a change in a REIT’s property type focus. If investors prefer to make 
their own portfolio diversification decisions by employing property-type focused REITs, I 
hypothesize that investors will react positively to a REIT’s property portfolio changes which 
increase their narrow property type focus (H1). Conversely, investors should react negatively to 
events which decrease a REIT’s property type focus (H2). 
 
To examine the research hypothesis, I take three research processes. First, I obtain event 
announcements of the property portfolio changes including transactions and JV formations of 
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REITs over the sample period, 1990-2009. Then, I classify the samples of property portfolio 
change: acquisitional events that decrease property-type focus, neutral acquisitional events which 
do not change property-type focus, dispositional events which increase property-type focus, and 
neutral dispositional events which do not change property-type focus. Secondly, I employ 
standard event study methodology to investigate the abnormal return around the event 
announcements and apply it to the groups classified in the first step. Lastly, I use a cross-
sectional OLS regression analysis to examine the relationship between abnormal returns on 
property portfolio changes and a set of potential variables of interest.  
 
I find evidence of significantly negative abnormal returns for acquisition and acquisitional JV 
events that decrease property-type focus. Abnormal returns for these acquisitional events are 
significantly more negative than those for neutral acquisitional events which do not change 
property-type focus. I also find significantly negative abnormal returns for acquisitions which 
decrease geographical focus consistent with Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2003). This is 
strong evidence of the diversification discount to support research hypothesis (H2). However, I 
do not find consistent support that dispositional events which increase property-type focus have 
significantly positive abnormal returns (H1). Only in the limited case of other property-type 
dispositional JVs do I find a statistically significant positive market reaction relative to those 
derived from the neutral dispositional events on the basis of the difference test.   
 
In terms of the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions, I find strong evidence of 
diversification discount derived from acquisitional events that decrease property-type focus of 
the REIT regardless of the sample period and type of property portfolio change. However, I do 
41 
 
not find evidence of a wealth benefit received by dispositional events which increase property-
type focus.  
 
In addition, I find that the deal size of property portfolio change and the number of security 
analyst are significant variables that affect the abnormal returns on announcement of property 
portfolio changes. I also find no evidence to support the idea that the diversification discount 
comes from endogeneity as argued by Villanova (2004).  
 
In sum, my results support hypothesis (H2).  Namely the market reacts significantly negative to 
acquisitions that decrease the focus of a REIT.  Furthermore, strictly speaking, my results do not 
support hypothesis (H1), that dispositional events which increase property-type focus should 
provoke a significant positive market reaction.  However, it should be noted that the market’s 
reaction to dispositional events that narrow property-type focus as measured in this study are, in 
fact, positive albeit not in a statistically significant fashion. This finding may potentially be 
explained by Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Prospect Theory asserts that 
people tend to be more severely psychologically impacted by losses or negative events than gains 
or positive events.  This phenomenon is known as loss aversion.  Thus we could expect to see a 
much stronger negative market reaction to events that investors do not like (REITs losing focus), 
in comparison to the investors’ positive reaction to events that investors do like (REITs 
increasing focus). Overall the results of this event study and cross-sectional regression analysis 
support the theory proposed by Geltner and Miller (2001) which postulates that investors prefer 
to make their own diversification decisions using narrowly focused property-type REITs.   
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Future Direction 
In this dissertation, I employ property portfolio changes including acquisitions, dispositions, and 
joint ventures of property-type focused REITs to examine the research question, what drives the 
property sector focus of REITs. In terms of the sample selection, I exclude property-type 
diversified REITs due to the difficulty in defining the property portfolio change which increases 
or decreases property-type focus. However, a future study could suggest the opposite research 
question: what makes diversified or hybrid REITs tend to be diversified?  For example, Campbell, 
White-Huckins and Sirmans (2006) find significantly positive abnormal returns on joint ventures 
when a diversified REIT is a JV partner. They argue that the JV may diminish the effect of the 
diversification discount associated with a diversified REIT by providing a vehicle partnering 
with specialized expertise.  The diversified nature of diversified REITs or hybrid REITs may 
yield a different market reaction to their property portfolio changes compared to focused REITs.  
 
I also find a significantly negative relationship between institutional ownership and abnormal 
returns from property portfolio changes. However, Below, Stansell, and Coffin (2000) find that 
different types of institutional investors have different investment objectives and needs. Thus, a 
future research could examine how abnormal returns on property portfolio changes of REITs are 
affected by different types of institutional investors.  
 
Geltner and Miller (2001) argue another possible explanation of the REIT’s general lack of 
diversification is that analysts can more easily understand REITs that specialize in one of the 
standard market segments in comparison to multiple market segments. Future research could 
investigate how security analysts affect REIT property-type diversification.  
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Table 1 ▪ Summary statistics for acquisition, disposition, acquisitional joint venture and dispositional joint venture by US REITs, by 
announcement period over the year 1990 – 2009 and REIT property type 
                  
 Number of Announcements 
Entire Period  Year 
1990 - 2009  1990-1993 1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2009 
Panel A: Acquisition & Disposition 
REIT property-type         
     Health Care REIT 8 (1.7%)  0 1 0 4 3 
     Office/ Industrial REIT 133 (28.7%)  2 29 36 36 30 
     Lodging / Resorts REIT 68 (14.7%)  0 11 12 23 22 
     Residential REIT 116 (25.1%)  1 26 29 38 22 
     Retail REIT 135 (29.2%)  3 16 31 49 36 
     Self-Storage REIT 3 (0.6%)  0 0 0 0 3 
     Total 463   6 83 108 150 116 
Panel B: Acquisitional JV & Dispositional JV 
REIT property-type         
     Health Care REIT 8 (4.7%)  0 2 2 0 4 
     Office/ Industrial REIT 61 (27.9%)  0 3 35 12 11 
     Lodging / Resorts REIT 20 (9.3%)  0 4 6 5 5 
     Residential REIT 31 (14.4%)  0 4 18 5 4 
     Retail REIT 86 (39.1%)  0 9 27 14 36 
     Self-Storage REIT 9 (4.7%)  0 1 6 0 2 
     Total 215     0 23 94 36 62 
         
Notes: Data include acquisitions, dispositions and joint ventures announced in the Dow Jones Newswire, the Press Release Wires or the Reuters Newswires. The 
announcement day refers to the earlier of the date of the first report of the announcing in one of these publications, which provides a trading day if the 
announcement is made before 3:59 p.m. However, if the event is announced after 3:59 p.m., the event day is considered as the next trading day of the 
announcement. I exclude a transaction from the sample if other significant events are announced during the event window or if a total value of transaction is less 
than $ 5 million. I employ property-type classifications for individual REITs obtained from the CRSP/Ziman US Real Estate Data Series which provides return 
series for individual REIT trading on the NASDAQ, New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange.  
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Table 2 ▪ Summary of deal value for data set of 463 real estate transactions (acquisition and disposition) and 215 joint ventures 
(acquisitional JV and dispositional JV) by equity REITs by announcement period over the year 1990 – 2009 
                
Deal Value ($M) 
Entire Period  Year 
1990 - 2009  1990-1993 1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2009 
Panel A: Acquisition & Disposition (463) 
Average Deal Size 37.35  15.65 16.64 48.20 36.63 44.12 
Standard Deviation 3.43  2.83 1.74 10.67 4.31 7.26 
Minimum 5.10  6.58 5.10 5.53 5.85 5.13 
Maximum 770.00  23.50 108.00 770.00 321.00 565.00 
Panel B: Acquisitional JV & Dispositional JV (215) 
Average Deal Size 251.99  0.00 63.58 175.62 395.20 354.52 
Standard Deviation 26.53  0.00 12.71 21.77 88.78 63.97 
Minimum 6.40  0.00 9.50 6.40 10.00 12.00 
Maximum 3,000.00   0.00 220.00 1,000.00 2,740.00 3,000.00 
        
Notes: Data include acquisitions, dispositions and joint ventures announced in the Dow Jones Newswire, the Press Release Wires or the Reuters Newswires. The 
announcement day refers to the earlier of the date of the first report of the announcing in one of these publications, which provides a trading day if the 
announcement is made before 3:59 p.m. However, if the event is announced after 3:59 p.m., the event day is considered as the next trading day of the 
announcement. I exclude a transaction from the sample if other significant events are announced during the event window or if a total value of transaction is less 
than $ 5 million. ($M: Millions of Dollars) 
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Table 3 ▪ Distribution of data set of 463 real estate transactions (acquisition and disposition) and 215 joint ventures (acquisitional JV 
and dispositional JV) by equity REITs by announcement period over the year 1990 – 2009 
                    
Number of Announcements 
 Entire Period   Year   Deal Value ($M) 
1990 - 2009   1990-1993 1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2009  1990 - 2009 
Panel A: Acquisition & Disposition 
Total Acquisition 228  6 51 45 76 50  37.47 
     Acquisition - Other Property-type 61  5 9 12 24 11  41.57 
     Acquisition - Same Property-type 167  1 42 33 52 39  35.97 
          
Total Disposition 235  0 32 63 74 66  37.22 
     Disposition - Other Property-type 71  0 18 24 19 10  63.40 
     Disposition - Same Property-type 164  0 14 39 55 56  25.89 
          
Total 463  6 83 108 150 116   37.35 
Panel B: Acquisitional JV & Dispositional JV 
Total Acquisitional JV 136  0 20 62 21 33  243.99 
     Acquisitional JV- Other Property-type 22  0 1 9 5 7  242.19 
     Acquisitional JV - Same Property-type 114  0 19 53 16 26  244.34 
          
Total Dispositional JV 79  0 3 32 15 29  265.76 
     Dispositional JV - Other Property-type 8  0 0 3 1 4  474.63 
     Dispositional JV - Same Property-type 71  0 3 29 14 25  242.23 
          
Total 215   0 23 94 36 62   251.99 
          
Notes: Data include acquisitions, dispositions and joint ventures announced in the Dow Jones Newswire, the Press Release Wires or the Reuters Newswires. The 
announcement day refers to the earlier of the date of the first report of the announcing in one of these publications, which provides a trading day if the 
announcement is made before 3:59 p.m. However, if the event is announced after 3:59 p.m., the event day is considered as the next trading day of the 
announcement. I exclude a transaction from the sample if other significant events are announced during the event window or if a total value of transaction is less 
than $ 5 million. ($M: Millions of Dollars) 
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Table 4 ▪ Announcement period daily and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in percent for REIT shareholders in a sample of 228 
acquisitions and 235 dispositions announced over the year 1990 – 2009 
                            
Property Transaction Announcements 
    Day (0)   Day (0, 1)   Day (-1, 0, +1) 
Obs.   CAR % Neg.   CAR % Neg.   CAR % Neg. 
Panel A: Acquisition 
Total Acquisition 228  -0.020  0.487  0.020  0.522  0.030  0.487 
              
     Acquisition - Other Property-type 61  -0.490 *** 0.607  -0.490 ** 0.623  -0.430 * 0.525 
     Acquisition - Same Property-type 167  0.150 * 0.443  0.210 * 0.485  0.190  0.473 
               
     t - Stats for difference (t critical value)   -2.690 *** (1.661)  -1.628 * (1.663)  -1.665 ** (1.663) 
Panel B: Disposition 
Total Disposition 235  0.200 ** 0.502  0.180 * 0.464  0.310 ** 0.472 
              
     Disposition - Other Property-type 71  0.380 ** 0.479  0.210  0.493  0.380 ** 0.465 
     Disposition - Same Property-type 164  0.120  0.494  0.170 * 0.451  0.280 * 0.476 
              
     t - Stats for difference (t critical value)     1.284   (1.653)   0.036   (1.653)   0.452   (1.653) 
Panel C: Geographical Diversification                           
Total Acquisition 228  -0.020  0.487  0.020  0.522  0.030  0.487 
              
     Acquisition - Other Geographical Location 58  -0.310 ** 0.638  -0.370 * 0.621  -0.340  0.569 
     Acquisition - Same Geographical Location 170  0.070  0.435  0.120  0.512  0.150  0.459 
              
     t - Stats for difference (t critical value)     -2.003 ** (1.659)   -1.749 ** (1.660)   -2.067 ** (1.659) 
              
Notes: Abnormal return is calculated in accordance with standard event study methodology following Mikkelson and Partch (1988). CRSP value weighted 
market return is used as the market proxy. Daily returns are obtained from the CRSP database. Estimation period is day -250 to day -20. Day 0 is the 
announcement day, which is the first date that news of the agreement is announced in the Dow Jones Newswire, the Press Release Wires or the Reuters 
Newswires. The announcement day refers to the earlier of the date of the first report of the announcing in one of these publications, which provides a trading day 
if the announcement is made before 3:59 p.m. However, if the event is announced after 3:59 p.m., the event day is considered as the next trading day of the 
announcement. 
***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 ▪ Announcement period daily and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in percent for REIT shareholders in a sample of 136 
acquisitional joint ventures and 79 dispositional joint ventures announced over the year 1990 – 2009 
                           
Joint Venture Announcements 
    Day (0)   Day (0, 1)   Day (-1, 0, +1) 
Obs.   CAR % Neg.   CAR % Neg.   CAR % Neg. 
Panel A: Acquisitional JV 
Total Acquisitional JV 136  0.250 *** 49.3  0.450 *** 42.6  0.450 ** 44.1 
              
     Acquisitional JV- Other Property-type 22  0.130  45.5  -0.050  45.5  0.070  40.9 
     Acquisitional JV - Same Property-type 114  0.270 *** 50.0  0.550 *** 42.1  0.530 * 44.7 
              
     t - Stats for difference (t critical value)   -1.225  (1.688)  -2.235 ** (1.681)  -1.570 * (1.681) 
Panel B: Dispositional JV 
Total Dispositional JV 79  -0.340  54.4  -0.320  49.4  -0.060  44.3 
              
     Dispositional JV - Other Property-type 8  0.150  62.5  0.840 ** 25.0  1.260 ** 37.5 
     Dispositional JV - Same Property-type 71  -0.400  53.5  -0.450  52.1  -0.210  45.1 
              
     t - Stats for difference (t critical value)     0.911   (1.796)   1.797 ** (1.753)   1.405 * (1.860) 
              
Notes: Abnormal return is calculated in accordance with standard event study methodology following Mikkelson and Partch (1988). CRSP value weighted 
market return is used as the market proxy. Daily returns are obtained from the CRSP database. Estimation period is day -250 to day -20. Day 0 is the 
announcement day, which is the first date that news of the agreement is announced in the Dow Jones Newswire, the Press Release Wires or the Reuters 
Newswires. The announcement day refers to the earlier of the date of the first report of the announcing in one of these publications, which provides a trading day 
if the announcement is made before 3:59 p.m. However, if the event is announced after 3:59 p.m., the event day is considered as the next trading day of the 
announcement. 
***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 ▪ Summary statistics of data set for variables in regression analysis over the announcement period 1990 – 2009 
            
Sample REITs on Announcements 
Mean Value (1900 - 2009) 
Total Asset ($M) Total Debt ($M) FFO ($M) Inst. Own. Analysts 
Panel A: Acquisition (228) 
Mean 1,950.38 951.94 29.31 0.59 3.39 
Minimum 32.67 0.00 -25.25 0.00 0 
Maximum 16,253.00 7,085.00 567.20 0.99 17 
Panel B: Disposition (235) 
Mean 3,054.94 1,574.65 47.80 0.62 4.31 
Minimum 24.61 13.21 -114.27 0.00 0 
Maximum 21,516.68 14,528.80 1,026.74 1.00 18 
Panel C: Acquisitional JV (136) 
Mean 2,472.60 1,237.85 31.09 0.62 3.47 
Minimum 98.51 20.00 -3.85 0.02 0 
Maximum 18,660.11 8,593.17 237.44 1.00 13 
Panel D: Dispositional JV (79) 
Mean 3,926.11 2,202.81 40.47 0.65 3.90 
Minimum 181.10 45.07 1.41 0.00 0 
Maximum 24,883.37 12,063.74 275.27 0.99 13 
      
Notes: Accounting data including total asset, debt and Funds from Operations (FFO) are obtained from COMPUSTAT and from 10Q and 10K SEC filings. The 
number of analyst data is obtained from Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES).  Institutional holdings from CDA/Spectrum 13 (f) Institutional Holdings 
is provided by Thomson Reuters. All information is data at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement of the property portfolio change. ($M: Millions 
of Dollars) 
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Table 7 ▪ Summary statistics of continuous variables in regression analysis over the announcement period 1990 – 2009 
                
Summary Statistics (1990 - 2009) 
Continuous Variable 
CAR (2) lnSIZE SIZER DEBTR PFFO INST ANALY 
Panel A: Entire Sample (678) 
Mean 0.001 21.075 0.061 0.495 0.014 0.613 3.794 
Standard Deviation 0.020 1.205 0.125 0.144 0.014 0.261 2.987 
Minimum -0.203 17.019 0.001 0.000 -0.074 0.000 0 
Maximum 0.106 23.937 1.458 1.072 0.210 0.999 18 
Panel B: Acquisition & Disposition (463) 
Mean 0.001 20.959 0.034 0.493 0.014 0.603 3.855 
Standard Deviation 0.019 1.260 0.054 0.148 0.014 0.264 3.157 
Minimum -0.081 17.019 0.001 0.000 -0.074 0.000 0 
Maximum 0.106 23.792 0.575 0.991 0.194 0.997 18 
Panel C: Acquisitional JV & Dispositional JV (215) 
Mean 0.002 21.325 0.119 0.501 0.013 0.634 3.656 
Standard Deviation 0.023 1.037 0.195 0.135 0.015 0.253 2.591 
Minimum -0.203 18.406 0.002 0.040 -0.018 0.002 0 
Maximum 0.074 23.937 1.458 0.845 0.210 0.999 13 
Panel D: Correlation Among Continuous Variable 
lnSIZE  1      
SIZER  -0.216 1     
DEBTR  0.185 -0.010 1    
PFFO  -0.050 -0.017 -0.252 1   
INST  0.553 -0.051 0.039 -0.037 1  
ANALY   0.499 -0.091 0.010 -0.052 0.371 1 
        
 Notes: CAR (2) is two-day (days 0, +1) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for an equally balanced portfolio around the event announcement; lnSIZE is the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; SIZER is the ratio of the total price of property portfolio 
change, divided by the firm’s total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement (SIZE); DEBTRD is the debt ratio of the total debt divided by 
total assets of the firm at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; PFFO is the Funds from Operations divided by total assets at the end of the last 
quarter prior to the announcement; INST is the number of shares owned by institutional investors divided by the total number of outstanding shares at the end of 
the last quarter prior to the announcement; ANALY is the number of analyst to forecasts of FFO for REITs at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement.  
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Table 8 ▪ Regressions of announcement period abnormal returns in 463 property portfolio changes (acquisition and disposition) by US 
REITs over the announcement period 1990 – 2009 and sub-periods 
                         
Acquisition & Disposition (463) 
  Entire Period (1990 - 2009)   1990 - 1999   2000 - 2009 
  Coefficient t-stat            Coefficient t-stat                Coefficient t-stat 
Constant  0.028  (1.36)  0.112  (3.48)  0.037  (1.32) 
PROPD  -0.008 *** (-2.68)  -0.016 *** (-3.45)  -0.007 ** (-2.04) 
PROPF  0.003  (1.21)  0.007 * (1.72)  0.001  (0.36) 
lnSIZE  -0.001  (-0.70)  -0.005 *** (-3.04)  -0.001  (-0.68) 
SIZER  0.016  (0.88)  0.068 *** (3.38)  -0.059 * (-1.94) 
DEBTR  -0.010  (-1.59)  -0.008  (-0.88)  -0.010  (-1.26) 
PFFO  -0.005  (-0.07)  0.027  (0.22)  -0.038  (-0.50) 
INST  -0.015 *** (-3.47)  -0.018  (-2.36)  -0.018 *** (-3.46) 
ANALY  0.001 ** (2.44)  0.001 * (1.78)  0.001 ** (2.05) 
GEOD  -0.006 ** (-2.02)  -0.008 * (-1.95)  -0.003  (-0.81) 
ACDS   0.002   (0.97)   0.003   (0.81)   0.003   (1.13) 
Adj. R
2
  0.038    0.215    0.039   
F:  2.952    4.691    2.449   
    (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.01)     
             
Notes: Dependent variable is CAR (2), the two-day (days 0, +1) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for an equally balanced portfolio around the event 
announcement; lnSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; SIZER is the ratio of the total 
price of property portfolio change, divided by the firm’s total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement (SIZE); DEBTRD is the debt ratio of 
the total debt divided by total assets of the firm at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; PFFO is the Funds from Operations divided by total 
assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; INST is the number of shares owned by institutional investors divided by the total number of 
outstanding shares at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; ANALY is the number of analyst to forecasts of FFO for REITs at the end of the last 
quarter prior to the announcement; PROPD is dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change decreases property-type focus and 0 otherwise; PROPF 
is dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change increase property-type focus and 0 otherwise; GEOD is dummy variable equal to 1 if the property 
portfolio change decreases geographical focus and 0 otherwise; ACDS is dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change derives from acquisition or 
acquisitional JV and 0 otherwise. 
***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9 ▪ Regressions of announcement period abnormal returns in 215 property portfolio changes (acquisitional joint venture and 
dispositional joint venture) by US REITs over the announcement period 1990 – 2009 and sub-periods 
                         
Joint Venture (215) 
  Entire Period (1990 - 2009)   1990 - 1999   2000 - 2009 
            Coefficient t-stat        Coefficient t-stat          Coefficient t-stat 
Constant  -0.049  (-1.20)  -0.062  (-1.17)  -0.037  (-0.58) 
PROPD  -0.012 * (-1.81)  -0.023 ** (-2.08)  -0.010  (-1.13) 
PROPF  0.002  (0.19)  -0.007  (-0.31)  0.004  (0.36) 
lnSIZE  0.002  (0.94)  0.002  (0.98)  0.002  (0.54) 
SIZER  0.015 * (1.85)  0.038 *** (2.73)  0.008  (0.75) 
DEBTR  -0.006  (-0.49)  -0.009  (-0.67)  -0.017  (-0.79) 
PFFO  -0.079  (-0.73)  -0.398  (-1.21)  -0.082  (-0.63) 
INST  -0.001  (-0.20)  0.008  (0.77)  -0.004  (-0.45) 
ANALY  0.002 *** (3.39)  0.002 ** (2.48)  0.002 ** (2.32) 
ACDS  0.009 ** (2.42)  0.007  (1.43)  0.010 ** (1.99) 
JVRT   0.009   (1.16)   0.024   (1.57)   0.004   (0.44) 
Adj. R
2
  0.073    0.146    0.022   
F:  2.939    2.699    1.524   
    (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.13)     
             
Notes: Dependent variable is CAR (2), the two-day (days 0, +1) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for an equally balanced portfolio around the event 
announcement; lnSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; SIZER is the ratio of the total 
price of property portfolio change, divided by the firm’s total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement (SIZE); DEBTRD is the debt ratio of 
the total debt divided by total assets of the firm at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; PFFO is the Funds from Operations divided by total 
assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; INST is the number of shares owned by institutional investors divided by the total number of 
outstanding shares at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; ANALY is the number of analyst to forecasts of FFO for REITs at the end of the last 
quarter prior to the announcement; PROPD is dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change decreases property-type focus and 0 otherwise; PROPF 
is dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change increase property-type focus and 0 otherwise; ACDS is dummy variable equal to 1 if the property 
portfolio change derives from acquisition or acquisitional JV and 0 otherwise; JVRT is dummy variable equal to 1 if a JV partner is another REIT and 0 otherwise. 
***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10 ▪ Announcement period daily and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in percent for REIT shareholders in a sample of 364 
acquisitional events (acquisitions and acquisitional JVs) and 314 dispositional events (dispositions and dispositional JVs) over the y 
                           
  
    Day (0)   Day (0, 1)   Day (-1, 0, +1) 
Obs.   CAR % Neg.   CAR % Neg.   CAR % Neg. 
Panel A: Acquisition & Acquisitional JV 
Total Acquisitional Events 364  0.080 * 0.489  0.180 ** 0.486  0.190  0.470 
              
     Acquisitional Events - Other Property-type 83  -0.320 ** 0.566  -0.370 ** 0.578  -0.300  0.494 
     Acquisitional Events - Same Property-type 281  0.200 *** 0.466  0.340 *** 0.459  0.330 ** 0.463 
              
     t - Stats for difference (t critical value)   -3.078 *** (1.657)  -2.493 *** (1.657)  -2.288 ** (1.657) 
Panel B: Disposition & Dispositional JV                           
Total Dispositional Events 314  0.060  0.513  0.060 * 0.471  0.220 ** 0.465 
              
     Dispositional Events - Other Property-type 79  0.360 ** 0.532  0.280 ** 0.468  0.470 ** 0.456 
     Dispositional Events - Same Property-type 235  -0.040  0.506  -0.020  0.472  0.130 * 0.468 
              
     t - Stats for difference (t critical value)     1.934 ** (1.652)   0.818   (1.651)   1.012   (1.654) 
              
Notes: Abnormal return is calculated in accordance with standard event study methodology following Mikkelson and Partch (1988). CRSP value weighted 
market return is used as the market proxy. Daily returns are obtained from the CRSP database. Estimation period is day -250 to day -20. Day 0 is the 
announcement day, which is the first date that news of the agreement is announced in the Dow Jones Newswire, the Press Release Wires or the Reuters 
Newswires. The announcement day refers to the earlier of the date of the first report of the announcing in one of these publications, which provides a trading day 
if the announcement is made before 3:59 p.m. However, if the event is announced after 3:59 p.m., the event day is considered as the next trading day of the 
announcement. 
***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 11 ▪ Regressions of announcement period abnormal returns in 678 property portfolio changes (acquisition, disposition, 
acquisitional joint venture and dispositional joint venture) by US REITs over the announcement period 1990 – 2009 and sub-periods 
                         
All Sample 
  Entire Period (1990 - 2010)   1990 - 1999   2000 - 2009 
  Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat 
Constant  0.010  (0.53)  0.063  (2.21)  -0.001  (-0.04) 
PROPD  -0.006 ** (-2.35)  -0.009 ** (-2.20)  -0.007 ** (-1.99) 
PROPF  -0.001  (-0.20)  -0.004  (-0.82)  0.002  (0.47) 
lnSIZE  0.000  (-0.30)  -0.003 ** (-2.34)  0.001  (0.45) 
SIZER  0.016 ** (2.33)  0.041 *** (3.57)  0.006  (0.69) 
DEBTR  -0.007  (-1.27)  -0.004  (-0.52)  -0.011  (-1.43) 
PFFO  -0.044  (-0.77)  -0.032  (-0.25)  -0.068  (-1.04) 
INST  -0.010 *** (-2.72)  -0.003  (-0.45)  -0.014 ** (-3.06) 
ANALY  0.001 *** (3.52)  0.001 ** (2.47)  0.001 *** (2.68) 
GEOD  -0.005 * (-1.68)  -0.005  (-1.26)  -0.004  (-1.06) 
ADJV_Ac  0.006 ** (1.96)  0.007  (1.35)  0.005 *** (1.46) 
ADJV_Dis  0.003  (0.99)  0.004  (0.69)  0.002  (0.70) 
ADJV_JVA   0.005 * (1.78)   0.003   (0.60)   0.009 ** (2.20) 
Adjusted R
2
  0.037    0.091    0.059   
F:  3.153    2.744    2.379   
    (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.01)     
             
Notes: Dependent variable is CAR (2), the two-day (days 0, +1) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for an equally balanced portfolio around the event 
announcement; lnSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; SIZER is the ratio of the total 
price of property portfolio change, divided by the firm’s total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement (SIZE); DEBTRD is the debt ratio of 
the total debt divided by total assets of the firm at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; PFFO is the Funds from Operations divided by total 
assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; INST is the number of shares owned by institutional investors divided by the total number of 
outstanding shares at the end of the last quarter prior to the announcement; ANALY is the number of analyst to forecasts of FFO for REITs at the end of the last 
quarter prior to the announcement; PROPD is dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change decreases property-type focus and 0 otherwise; PROPF 
is dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change increase property-type focus and 0 otherwise; GEOD is dummy variable equal to 1 if the property 
portfolio change decreases geographical focus and 0 otherwise; ADJV_Ac is dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change derives from acquisition 
and 0 otherwise; ADJV_Dis is dummy variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change derives from disposition and 0 otherwise; ADJV_JVA is dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the property portfolio change derives from acquisitional JV and 0 otherwise. 
***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1 ▪ Property-type Allocation for the CRSP / Ziman Equity REITs Index (1980-2009) 
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